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1. Introduction 
 
Speaking has traditionally been reputed an intentional activity. From 
St. Augustin’s theory of sign to Grice’s pragmatic theory, the presence of 
intentions has often been conceived as a defining feature of human verbal 
communication. However, it is one thing to make an intuitive appeal to the 
notion of intentionality, but quite another to give to that notion a clear 
explanatory role in pragmatic accounts of spoken communication. This 
latter task may appear difficult to accomplish, and in fact many have 
questioned that it is feasible at all. 
Various arguments have been proposed in order to show that the very 
notion of individual intention is problematic, if not untenable, as an 
explanation of spoken communication. One major line of reasoning 
consists in emphasizing the role of social interaction, conceived of as prior 
to and constitutive of individual intentions. In other words, individual 
intention would be something which needs to be explained as a product of 
communication, rather than something in terms of which communication 
could be explained. This argument, however, admits of a variety of more 
or less radical interpretations. For instance, in a weak interpretation what 
is rejected is simply the idea that the action of speaking is generally 
prompted by an explicit representation of the communicative goal to be 
pursued, and that the hearer has explicitly to recover that representation in 
order to understand the message conveyed. Such an interpretation does not 
preclude the possibility that individual intention plays some explanatory 
role, on condition that intentions are not conceived of in terms of explicit 
representations. Yet, some scholars embrace a stronger interpretation 
according to which human communication does not involve individual 
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intentions in any interesting sense, and we had better substitute that very 
notion with a different one, let us say, with the notion of collective 
intentionality, or the like. 
Elsewhere I have explored and defended the weak interpretation, with 
regard both to the speaker’s and hearer’s point of view respectively, in 
Mazzone and Campisi (2010) and Mazzone (2009; in press). However, in 
those previous papers I did not directly compare weak and strong 
interpretations, or address in any detail the arguments proposed by the 
latter. A closer analysis and a rebuttal of the strong interpretation is 
precisely the aim of the present work. This analysis, however, does not 
have an exclusively negative motivation: on the contrary, an accurate 
evaluation of the arguments in favour of a strongly social perspective on 
intentional communication allows a better understanding of the subtle 
interweaving of social and individual aspects in communicative 
intentionality. In particular, one major conclusion I will draw from the 
present analysis is that a robust comprehension of the actual individual 
intentions involved in speaking is a key component of communicative 
interactions, even under the assumption that those interactions may in turn 
play a significant role in determining communicative intentions. 
In practice, I will start by summarizing the weak argument from social 
interaction that I embraced in Mazzone and Campisi (in press) and 
Mazzone (2009; in press); then I will discuss some versions of the strong 
argument from social interaction, in order to show that they cannot call 
into question the notion of individual intention–although they may help us 
to refine our comprehension of that notion. 
 
 
2. Intentions from the speaker’s side 
 
In an ideal sense, intentions are goal representations i) delivered 
through practical reasoning about behavioural ends, ii) being causally 
efficacious in prompting actions oriented toward those goals, and iii) put 
to use in the service of online control of behaviour (cfr. Pacherie 2006). 
The third condition concerns, more specifically, the maintenance of 
current goals until they are accomplished, the inhibition of alternative 
courses of action when needed, and the fine-tuning of action through 
monitoring of the fit between intended and actual outcomes. 
However, we may doubt whether the exact sequence of events from 
step i) to step iii) always occurs when humans are engaged in actions of 
some sort. In the first place, it is immediately clear that only exceptionally 
we perform extensive practical reasoning about behavioural ends before 
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acting: therefore, the first requirement is very rarely met. We will return to 
this issue soon. In the second place, in Mazzone and Campisi (in press) a 
large body of literature is reviewed which shows that goal-directed actions 
are often quite automatic, in the sense that they are prompted 
unreflectively by environmental cues rather than by anticipation of the 
outcome. In practice, as far as routinized activities are concerned, 
associative schemata are formed which link behavioural responses, their 
outcomes, and the circumstances in which those responses are normally 
triggered; once such schemata are in place, the simple presence of the 
appropriate circumstance may trigger the behavioural response even when 
a representation of the outcome has not (yet) been activated. Outcome 
representations, however, may be subsequently activated and recruited in 
the service of online behavioural control. In fact, step iii) seems a much 
more robust requirement of what we incline to call “intentional behaviour” 
than step ii): on many occasions goal representations might not be the 
triggering cause of goal-directed actions, even though those 
representations play a role in assuring that the goal is consistently pursued. 
In order to see why point iii) appears to be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for there being intentional action, consider the following lines by 
Hommel (2003, 597): 
 
“[I]t was William James who pointed out that “no creature not endowed 
with divinatory power can perform an act voluntarily for the first time”. 
The reason is that intentional action presupposes a goal and, hence, some 
expectation about the effect of action, almost by definition”. 
 
In other words, it cannot be said that we have acted in a certain way 
intentionally, that is, with the intention to fulfil a certain goal, unless we 
had known in advance that our action was in fact apt to pursue that goal. 
This can be understood in the first place as meaning that we must have 
previously stored some knowledge about the relationship between 
behaviour and outcome. Furthermore, our action could hardly be 
considered intentional unless that stored knowledge has actually played 
some role in driving the action towards and until its expected outcome. If 
someone does not know that an action has certain consequences, or if such 
a knowledge has been irrelevant for all the course of her behaviour, then it 
can hardly be said that she has performed a goal-directed action 
intentionally. On the other hand, it does not seem a necessary condition for 
an action being intentional that the outcome representation is what actually 
triggers the action. Therefore, condition iii) appears to be necessary and 
probably sufficient for there being intentional action. 
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This argument, however, does not license the conclusion that 
conditions i) and ii) are never met, or that they are of no importance for 
human intentional behaviour. Of particular interest is condition i). When 
we limit consideration to the immediate temporal vicinity of action, it is 
undoubtedly true that actions are almost never preceded by practical 
reasoning, be it about goals or means. However, there is an important 
long-distance relationship between action and deliberation: a given action 
does not need to follow a prior deliberation immediately for the former to 
be affected by the latter. In particular, Mazzone and Campisi (in press) 
recall that practical reasoning about what we should do in given 
circumstances may progressively come to change habitual behaviours, to 
the point of creating new habits which are more consistent with our overall 
preferences. As a consequence, an habitual and automatic behaviour could 
be intentional in the sense of condition i), to the extent that it has been 
deliberated in the past. Since humans spend a large amount of time in the 
social practice of rational discussion, where reasons for action are given 
and asked for, and since this practice is to some degree internalized so as 
to become an individual habit, then it is reasonable to assume that most of 
our habitual behaviours have been reflectively evaluated, at some point of 
our existence, with regard to their fit with our preferences. In this precise 
sense, most of our automatic behaviours may be intentional according to 
condition i) as well. 
It should be emphasized that, in the picture drawn by Mazzone and 
Campisi (in press), intentions are not conceived of as propositional 
attitudes, as they have been in traditional philosophical accounts. That is, 
intentions are not linguistic or quasi-linguistic formulations of goals; they 
appear to be much more complex entities. As we saw, in order to have 
intentions a cognitive system needs to represent correlations between 
behaviours, outcomes and contexts (i.e., the circumstances in which those 
behaviours may take place). Furthermore, since intentional actions are 
often nonetheless automatic, they presumably involve sub-cortical circuits 
which are responsible for procedural processing. More generally, the 
representations involved in intentional behaviour seem to be for the most 
part modal (that is, sensory and motor) representations, rather than 
propositional ones. According to the model proposed by Dehaene et al. 
(2006), conscious and controlled processes require the establishing of a 
long-distance loop between independently activated sensory-motor 
representations and higher association cortices. With regard to the latter, a 
crucial role is played by pre-frontal and anterior cingulate cortex, which 
are responsible for maintenance of the current action until its end, 
sequential organization of action, and active inhibition of alternative 
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behaviours. Given this complex picture, a quasi-linguistic representation 
of goals is certainly not sufficient, and presumably not even necessary, for 
actions to be intentional. 
Moreover, since we assume that intentional actions are mostly driven 
by behavioural schemata, it should be kept in mind that schemata at 
different levels of generality and abstractness need to be integrated in 
order to produce a coherent flow of action. Goal-directed actions have a 
hierarchical structure, with super-ordinated goals being implemented by 
sequences of lower-level goals (Grafton and Hamilton 2007). Moreover, 
behavioural schemata must be adapted to particular contexts, thus 
generating specific contextual outcomes. These observations pose a 
serious problem as to which outcomes are actually intended. In our 
picture, behaviours are intended in a crucial sense –condition iii)– to the 
extent that their outcome is actually represented and attended so as to 
guide action. However, the recall of outcome representations in the service 
of online control is probably always partial and sparse, and it is far from 
obvious that some level of abstraction and generality is necessarily 
attended to the detriment of others, in every circumstance and for the 
entire course of action. Therefore, we should seriously consider the 
possibility that no such thing as “the” intention underlying an action 
exists; rather, each instance of human behaviour could have its own 
complex pattern of intentional and automatic components. 
To sum up, as should now be clear, the picture we propose is very far 
from the philosophical conception of intentions as simple propositional 
representations, possibly following from deliberate reasoning, explicitly 
attended by the subject and being the triggering causes of action. On the 
other hand, our picture is compatible with some of the arguments offered 
against individual intentions. For instance, according to Dennett (1989) 
intentions do not exist except in the eyes of the observer –so to speak– 
when she adopts an “intentional stance” on behaviours. One of Dennett’s 
chief arguments to this effect concerns the alleged semantic 
indetermination of intentions: as is well known by philosophers, it is far 
from easy to say exactly which beliefs and desires, and hence which 
intentions, are involved in a single action. This observation, however, is 
wholly consistent with our proposal: to the extent that we conceive of 
intentional actions as driven by patterns of behavioural schemata, there 
need not be any explicit propositional representations of the ultimate goal. 
Another important set of critiques comes from the anthropological 
literature. Duranti (1998, 2007), for instance, has argued that speakers are 
not basically driven by their individual intentions; linguistic behaviour, in 
particular, is rather embedded in social routines which have a social 
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normative “strength” of their own. Consequently, what a speaker does in a 
conversation is not simply what she consciously thinks she is doing: when 
we enter a routine it is this same routine which essentially decides for us. 
We could speak here of a sort of proxy-intention: intentions we might not 
entertain consciously, or even represent at all, but that are socio-
normatively embedded in the behaviours we are engaged in. But this is 
consistent with the idea of intentional behaviour as largely automatic, 
based on habits which are promoted by routine social actions. 
A fine illustration of this point is contained in Garrod and Pickering 
(2007). They observe that “[i]n dialogue, what one interlocutor says 
imposes constraints on what her partner can say next. For example, a 
question usually requires an answer.” As a consequence, the repeated 
practice of dialogue “may make production more automatic” than it would 
be in an ideal monologue condition (ib.: 10): answering a question is 
largely an automatic response, triggered by the question itself without any 
deliberate consideration of goals. Garrod and Pickering specifically focus 
on the existence of verbal routines delivering automatic processing. 
However, social routines of any sort, be they verbal or not, could constrain 
types of communicative moves. For instance, Levinson (1992) has 
proposed that, on the basis of social regularities we are exposed to, we 
store in memory a large variety of “activity types”, conceived of as “goal-
defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraints on 
participants, setting, and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable 
contributions” (ib.: 69). Activity types apparently have a sequential 
structure, since they prescribe which moves, be they communicative or 
not, one has to perform at any point of a given activity. Participation in 
such social regularities can therefore be expected to produce routinization 
of behaviour of the kind envisaged by Garrod and Pickering; as a 
consequence, as soon as the agent is engaged in social interactions, she is 
prompted to react quite automatically to preceding pieces of behaviour in 
accordance with the stored activity types. 
These are good examples of what Duranti has in mind when he speaks 
of routines with a social normative “strength” of their own. Through 
internalization of social regularities, an agent may unreflectively pursue 
outcomes that she does not explicitly represent at all, or at least, whose 
representation is not the triggering cause of action. 
 
 
3. Intentions from the hearer side 
 
Marco Mazzone 
59 
So far we have addressed the issue of communicative intention from 
the speaker’s point of view. Complementary considerations can be made 
from the hearer’s side (see also Mazzone 2009; in press). The vast 
literature on this topic has sometimes assumed that reading others’ 
communicative intentions involves complex metarepresentational abilities, 
that is, the hearer has to produce in the simplest case some propositional 
representation of the form “S intends that P”, where S is the speaker and P 
a proposition. In general terms, the hearer should be able to explicitly 
represent the fact that the speaker entertains a certain representation. This 
assumption, however, has been judged implausibly demanding by many in 
the field. Consequently, alternative pictures have been proposed where, in 
line with the account of communicative intentions we gave above, 
intention reading does not also require propositional representations. 
In fact, one possibility is that the goal-directed behavioural schemata 
subserving the speaker’s communicative performances are also what 
drives the hearer’s understanding. This might appear quite a reasonable 
hypothesis if only one considers that speakers are hearers as well. For 
instance, let us recall the Garrod and Pickering’s example of question-
answer pairs: when someone listen to a question and unreflectively 
responds with an answer, such response can however be considered the 
effect (or the manifestation) of an implicit understanding. That is, 
whenever the speaker answers a question she can also be said to have 
understood the question as something designed to obtain an answer. 
This is but another formulation of an assumption that is widely held in 
the psychological literature on intentional action: the assumption that 
planning and understanding a goal-directed action are two sides of the 
same coin, and possibly depend on the same kind of behavioural schemata. 
Bernhard Hommel (Hommel et al. 2001; Hommel 2003), for instance, has 
put forth the “theory of event coding”, whose main idea is that goal-
directed actions are represented in terms of their perceived effects by 
means of sensory-motor associations: 
 
“First (i.e., as a baby or a novice of a given task), we move in a more or 
less random fashion, that is, without being able to predict or aim at 
particular action effects. However, moving always produces particular 
sensory effects that we can perceive. The codes of these perceived effects 
are automatically associated with the motor patterns producing them, 
thereby creating bidirectional movement-effect associations” (Hommel 
2003, 596). 
 
Hommel then suggests that while action planning can be performed 
through searching for a motor action associated to an intended effect, 
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action understanding is inversely performed through searching for a 
possible effect associated to a motor action. As Sebanz et al. (2006, 71) 
put it, “actions are not purely coded in terms of visual properties of the 
observed movement, but rather in terms of action goals”. This is 
sometimes intended as meaning that one understands the action’s goal on 
condition that she can find a complete motor schema of the action, so that 
she may perform a motor simulation of the action till to its end (Umiltà et 
al., 2001; Fogassi et al., 2005). This assumption is at times referred to as 
the “motor theory” of action and social cognition (Gallese, 2003; 
Blakemore-Decety 2001). A couple of things, however, should be 
emphasized. First, it is far from obvious that goals can be coded in terms 
of motor schemata in every case: for instance, as Jacob and Jeannerod 
(2005) have noticed, by pressing a switch an agent can pursue the goal of 
turning on the light. Now, such a goal has apparently to be coded by a 
visual rather than a motor schema, since there cannot be motor schemata 
of the light having being turned on. Second, it also seems that contexts can 
play a key role in understanding goals. For instance, in Iacoboni et al.’s 
(2005) experiment a tea-cup was put in two different contexts, an after-tea 
context and a before-tea context, so as to suggest that the cup was grasped, 
respectively, in order to clean it up or to drink tea. It could be argued that 
there are in fact motor schemata both of washing the cup and ingesting the 
tea, and hence that the goal can be specified by those schemata in 
accordance with the motor theory. However, the experiment is based on 
the assumption that “the context suggested the intention associated with 
the grasping action (either drinking or cleaning)” (ib.: 529), and this fact 
seems to show that intentions can be inferred on the basis of experiential 
associations between motor schemata and contexts, rather than by motor 
schemata alone. Putting the pieces together, we might say that 
understanding a goal-directed behaviour needs the observers (or hearers) 
to have stored sensory-motor associations between actions, contexts and 
outcomes, which is exactly the conclusion we have drawn from the agent’s 
side. 
Interestingly, actions, contexts and outcomes are also crucial 
components of what Gergely and Csibra (Gergely et al. 1995; Gergely and 
Csibra 2003) have called “teleological reasoning”, that is, a form of 
behaviour interpretation which is already at play in babies as young as 
twelve months and is reputed to be a precursor of genuine intentional 
reasoning. Early teleological reasoning is in fact supposed to show the 
same structure that will be found later in proper intention-reading: agents 
are understood as pursuing some goals, and as doing so rationally, that is, 
adopting “the most efficient (rational) means available to them within the 
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constraints of the situation” (Király et al., 2003: 755). Actions are then 
conceived in terms of rational means for accomplishing goals in given 
contexts, thanks to an intuitive principle of rationality. For instance, in an 
experiment 
 
“twelve-month-olds were habituated to a computer-animated goal-directed 
event in which a small circle approached and contacted a large circle 
(‘goal’) by jumping over (‘means act’) an obstacle separating them 
(‘situational constraint’). During the test phase we changed the situational 
constraint by removing the obstacle. Infants then saw two test displays: the 
same jumping goal-approach as before, or a perceptually novel straight-
line goal-approach. They looked longer (indicating violation-of-
expectation) at the old jumping action (maybe because it seemed to them 
an inefficient means to the goal now that there was no obstacle to jump 
over), but showed no dishabituation to the novel straight-line goal-
approach (possibly because this action appeared to them the most efficient 
means to the goal in the new situation)” (Gergely-Csibra 2003: 288). 
 
The sensitivity of twelve-month-olds to the rational fit between action, 
context and goal may be the basis for action interpretation in infancy, and 
for the subsequent storage of behavioural schemata which will be put to 
use in planning and understanding action. Therefore, on the one hand the 
intuitive principle of rationality might determine the structure of stored 
behavioural schemata: given the importance of rational relationships 
between actions, contexts and goals, it is reasonable to assume that these 
three components are also integral to coding of actions. On the other hand, 
applying behavioural schemata to concrete circumstances might not be a 
purely mechanical affair, for at least two reasons: first, schemata might be 
underspecified with regard to specific situational constraints; second, 
schemata have to be flexibly applied to circumstances which are not 
entirely predictable. As a consequence, a fresh assessment of rationality 
might be required in order to ensure a good fit to present contexts. 
Let me insist on these two conclusions. First, just as goal-directed 
actions are presumably driven by behavioural schemata based on rational 
relationships between circumstances, actions and outcomes, so people 
presumably understand actions by applying the very same schemata to 
others’ behaviour. Therefore, both from the speaker’s and the hearer’s 
side, we should not think of intentions in terms of propositional attitudes: 
behavioural schemata are at the same time more complex and closer to 
sensory-motor experience than propositional attitudes are. Second, an 
assessment of rationality seems to be integral to both action and its 
understanding. The principle of rationality plausibly affects the 
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arrangement of stored behavioural schemata, but also their application to 
current circumstances in order to get the best fit between actions, goals 
and specific contexts. 
 
 
4. Radical interactionism 
 
What we have said so far implies that there are no such things as 
individual intentions only on condition that these are conceived of as 
propositional attitudes entertained by subjects before they speak, and in 
fact causing them to speak. We suggest that the notion of individual 
(communicative) intention should be revised so as to meet our previous 
considerations: a subject has an intention only when there is some goal-
directed behavioural schema which prompts (maybe automatically) her 
behaviour, can be put to use in the online control of action, and can also be 
recruited for an explicit evaluation of rationality–that is, an evaluation of 
the action’s efficacy in pursuing a given goal in the given circumstances. 
However, many have argued that a mere revision of the notion of 
individual intention would not be sufficient: the notion should rather be 
abandoned. A key argument for this conclusion is that the individual 
mind/brain would not be the right place to look for intentions. Gallagher 
(2008: 553) has well summarized this position with the following words: 
 
“In many instances what we call intentions are not the properties of one 
individual–they are properties that arise in and are shaped by my ongoing 
interaction with the other person. They may be shared intentions or they 
may be intentions in conflict, but in either case they may be the product of 
the interaction itself. In this way intentions can be intersubjectively 
constituted–co-constituted. Sometimes this happens in such a way that 
intentions emerge in the interactive process and in some cases I discover 
my own intention (or the other discovers her own intentions) only in 
acting. Sometimes I first discover what my intention is only because the 
other perceives it and responds accordingly”. 
 
To be true, this quote may seem to address the essentially factual point 
that, “in many instances”, interaction might contribute to determine 
individual intentions. Then, individual intentions would not be merely 
“individual”, in the precise sense that one has to take into account how 
intentions may sometimes depend on a super-individual dynamic. As it 
stands, the quotation does not preclude the possibility that agents do have 
individual representations concerning their own goals, and that this has 
some role in the explanation of intentional action, though often such 
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representations would emerge in the course of interaction with others. 
However, considerations like those in the above quotation often aim to a 
more radical conclusion than this: the conclusion that individual 
representations cannot play any role in accounting for intentions. 
Both in the philosophical and the anthropological field, for instance, it 
has been suggested that the notion of individual intention (and even of 
individual representation) would be integral to a rationalist, individualist 
and Cartesian account of human action, where a disputable separation 
between mind and reality is assumed, and intentions are thought of as 
internal representations which are open to introspection and explicit 
thinking –as if they were, so to speak, in the possession of the subject. In 
contrast with this account, a relational and dialogical view of people’s 
psychic life is sometimes argued for (Shotter 2005; Mehl-Madrona and 
Pennycook 2009), where intentionality and even representations are 
thought of as “distributed between us” rather than located in a private, 
inner space. In an anthropological perspective, this is motivated by the fact 
that human action is essentially embedded in cultural practices and 
regularities. In Duranti’s (1999: 135) words: “For anthropologists, the 
crucial issue is whether it is possible to separate intentional acts from the 
cultural context in which they are produced”. As we already saw, Duranti 
(1998; 2007) draws the conclusion that social routines have a strength of 
their own, so that when people are engaged in such routines it is this 
strength, rather than individual will and representations, which accounts 
for their behaviour. 
Therefore, one should not think of human intentional behaviour as 
something under the rational control of subjects. Such a rationalist and 
individualist view appears to be culturally specific to Western tradition, 
while it is hardly present in other cultures. In particular, a well-
documented case is that of Western Samoan villages, where in fact the 
meaning of utterances is conceived as the product of an interaction rather 
than as something located in an individual mind (Duranti 1993; 1998; 
2007). However, since Western speakers are used to give explicit, post hoc 
intentional explanations of action and communication, the notion of 
individual intention may play a role in their social explanatory practices, 
though not in a general theory of intention. As Arundale (2008: 255) puts 
it: 
 
“Is there any place for intention in explanations of language use [...]? Yes, 
in that intention appears prominently in the post hoc accounts for 
utterances and behaviours that Western speakers offer and that recipients 
construct and attribute to speakers […]. Intention can thus be understood 
productively as a member’s resource in accounts for instances of language 
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use, although not as a theoretician’s resource in explanations of language 
use in interaction”. 
 
Now, my claim is that whilst some of the previous arguments are 
presumably correct, nonetheless they do not license the alleged 
conclusion. To begin with, I do not need to insist anymore on the 
correctness of Duranti’s claim about the existence of social routines, 
endowed with a normative strength, to which most of the times agents 
conform without reflection. A related point is that human behaviour is 
rarely driven by explicit rational deliberation: routinization promotes the 
creation of efficient, straightforward automatisms which then play a major 
role in human life. Moreover, there is wide consonance among 
anthropologists about the cultural specificity of our conception of mind: 
the Western model of rational action is apparently not shared by other 
cultures. Finally, Gallagher is certainly right in pointing out that in the 
course of communicative interaction subjects may engage in negotiation of 
goals, so that the ultimate goal emerges from an intersubjective dynamic. 
However, in the next sections I will consider these points in more detail, in 
order to show that they do not license the conclusion that individual 
representations have no role to play in a theory of intentional action. On 
the contrary, individual representations of goals are even presupposed by a 
closer analysis of interactionist arguments. 
 
 
5. Normativity 
 
The appeal to the social and normative nature of intentions is 
sometimes used to argue against any account of intentionality couched in 
terms of individual representations. As it seems to me, however, the above 
considerations (sections 2 and 3) have robustly showed a sense in which 
individual representations implement intentions after all. One possibility is 
that we can speak of intentions also at a different, social and normative 
level, and that intentions of this sort are the ones which are not affected by 
what occurs at the individual level. 
In this perspective, it is interesting to consider Jennifer Saul’s (2002a, 
b) analysis of the notion of “what is implicated” by an utterance, that is, 
the Gricean notion of conversational implicature. Grice has famously 
distinguished between utterance meaning (i.e., what the utterance literally 
says) and speaker meaning (what the speaker intends to convey in a 
circumstance by that utterance), with conversational implicatures being the 
contextual inferences which lead from the former to the latter. Now, Saul 
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(2002a: 229) argues that “Grice’s characterizations of speaker meaning 
and conversational implicatures are cast in very different terms–the former 
completely in terms of speaker intentions and the latter incorporating a 
good deal about the audience”. As a consequence, the notion of 
conversational implicature would lend itself to a normative account where 
what does really matter is the fact that the speaker “makes available” a 
certain thought to the audience, independently of actual speaker’s 
intentions. This has not to be understood, however, as if the audience 
rather than the utterer is responsible for implicatures. In fact, Saul thinks 
that neither “utterer implicature” (what the speaker has tried to implicate) 
nor “audience implicature” (what the audience takes to be implicated) in 
themselves may determine conversational implicature, which is “a more 
normative notion than utterer&audience implicature” (ib.: 244). 
The general argument for such a conclusion is that the content “made 
available” by an utterance in a context may diverge from both what the 
utterer actually had in mind to convey, and what the audience actually 
thinks that the utterer had in mind to convey. In any case, the 
responsibility of both utterer (in uttering) and audience (in understanding) 
is determined by which content the utterance normatively implicates in the 
context, though utterer and audience may in fact be wrong about that 
content. Interestingly, this position is very close to Duranti’s idea that 
social routines have their own strength and set the agent’s responsibilities 
independently of what the agent may actually intend. What people do –the 
meaning of their behaviour– is not to be thought of as the private affair of 
subjects. 
The point, however, is whether a normative notion of that sort might be 
divorced in principle from how people actually behave. In fact, one thing 
is to claim that normative implicatures may diverge from what utterer and 
audience represent on occasion; quite another is to claim that normative 
implicatures are independent from what in general utterer and audience 
represent. The latter claim is highly problematic, since the kind of 
normativity at issue essentially depends on how people behave most of the 
time. For example, the main reason why a given move in a social routine 
gains its normative strength is that such a move is what people do, and 
expect others to do, in that circumstance most of the time. Analogously, an 
implicature in a context could not have a normative value for us, if it were 
not the implicature which normally utterers and audiences would converge 
on. In fact, it would be pointless for the utterer to implicate a meaning in a 
circumstance, unless as a general rule the audience can be expected to 
draw the very same implicature in that circumstance; conversely, it would 
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be pointless for the audience to draw an implicature in a context unless as 
a general rule the utterer can be expected to have intended it. 
To sum up, as Grice made clear many years ago, normative notions of 
this sort are idealizations: concrete behaviours tend toward ideal norms 
which are not, however, without exceptions. But then, it does not seem fair 
to say that those norms are independent from facts concerning individuals: 
although exceptions are allowed, without a robust convergence of actual 
individual behaviours there would not be any such norms at all. Therefore, 
even a normative notion of intention appears to presuppose the existence 
of individual intentions, since the former is an idealization emerging on 
the latter. 
Incidentally, it should be noted that the previous argument is not open 
to any charge of Cartesian introspectionism: in the framework delineated 
above (sections 2 and 3), individual intentions are implemented by 
behavioural schemata which only partially and sparsely may be accessed 
by agents. In accordance with that framework, the claim is not that the 
normative notions of implicature and intention depend on what the subject 
consciously thinks: rather, those notions are said to depend on largely 
automatic schemata which are in fact responsible for individual behaviour. 
 
 
6. Rationality 
 
Our proposal to conceive of intentions as schemata involved in 
behavioural control, rather than as mere propositional attitudes, has also 
consequences for the rationality issue. Grice’s project has been often 
charged with rationalism and, as we already saw, philosophical pragmatics 
as a whole has been judged guilty of ethnocentrism for its adherence to the 
Western model of rational action, a model that does not seem to be shared 
by other cultures. 
It should be noted, however, that in Grice’s rational account of 
communication two points were clearly distinguished. It is one thing for 
Grice to analyse implicatures in terms of explicit propositional inferences; 
his insistence on the purposive and rational nature of communication is 
quite another. While the former clearly was not one of his theoretical 
commitments (on the contrary, he has insistently declared that explicit 
deductions were not to be attributed to concrete speakers), the latter has 
been a core assumption of his theory: “one of my avowed aims is to see 
talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed, rational behavior” 
(Grice 1975: 28). In practice, according to Grice, people speak in order to 
pursue some communicative goal, and have to choose utterances apt to 
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pursue those goals in the given contexts. Complementarily, the audience 
understands what is uttered by assessing which goals could be pursued by 
uttering a sentence in a context. These tasks require rationality in the very 
same sense we described above (one needs to evaluate the efficacy of 
actions in accomplishing goals in contexts), and can therefore be 
accommodated within the explanatory framework we proposed above, 
based on behavioural schemata rather than propositional representations. 
If it is true that this non-verbal sort of rational reasoning is already 
present in children as young as twelve months of age, as Gergely and 
Csibra’s experiments seem to have demonstrated, then it is quite 
implausible that the exercise of that capacity may depend on the 
acquisition of cultural frames such as the Western model of rational 
action. More plausibly, the sensitivity to the rational fit between actions, 
outcomes and contexts is a universal trait of human action. In this 
perspective, we should be cautious about the conclusions to be drawn from 
the evidence concerning Samoan people; in general, the absence in human 
groups of an explicit cultural model of rational action is far from licensing 
conclusions on the actual reasoning practices. Astuti (2001: 429), for 
instance, has summarized her results about the Vezo’s conception of mind 
with the following words: 
 
The article takes to task the well-established anthropological claim that 
non-Western peoples are free from the traps of dualistic thinking. Although 
Vezo informants in Madagascar produce statements that could be used to 
support such a claim, experimental procedures that target their inferential 
reasoning reveal that they systematically differentiate between mind and 
body, between the biological processes that determine the organism and 
the social processes that shape personhood. This suggests that there is a 
significant discrepancy between people’s explicit linguistic statements and 
their implicit theoretical knowledge. 
 
Interestingly, Duranti (1993) has recognized the role played by non-
verbal and non-mentalistic rational reasoning in Samoans people: 
 
Given that human action, and speech as one aspect of it, is goal-oriented, 
Samoans, like any other people in the world, must interpret each other’s 
doings as having certain ends with respect to which those doings should be 
evaluated and dealt with. 
 
Therefore, what is peculiar to Western tradition is apparently not 
individual reasoning about the rational fit of means to ends (relative to 
contexts), but rather the existence of an explicit cultural model based on 
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that process, and promoting the social practice of giving, and asking for, 
(individual) reasons for action. Arguing, as Arundale (2008) does, that 
individual intentions may have a role in Western practices of post hoc 
action explanation but not in theories of how people actually 
communicate, has the unhappy consequence that our explanatory practices 
appear ungrounded and gratuitous. This in turn renders mysterious how 
the social practice of rational discussion may interfere with our automatic 
behaviour, and even create new habits (see above, § 2). On the contrary, 
our picture makes it easy to explain this interaction, since verbal reasoning 
on action is said to preserve the rational structure which one finds in 
behavioural schemata subserving action and its non-verbal understanding. 
To sum up, we are not committed to the idea that human action and its 
understanding require propositional rationality, although we suggest that 
the Western model of action is correct as to its general structure, based on 
the rational congruence of actions, outcomes and contexts. Western post 
hoc explanations of action capture, though in a propositional and 
dramatically simplified form, the implicit structure of human action. The 
absence in other cultures of an explicit model of rational action does not 
imply that individual action is not driven in general by an implicit 
principle of rationality. 
 
 
7. Negotiation 
 
One of the key arguments for strong interactionism is the consideration 
that meanings and intentions are negotiated among individuals, rather than 
possessed by single subjects. A communicative move seems to require the 
completion of the addressee’s response in order to acquire its true 
meaning: in Gallagher’s words, the speaker’s intention is intersubjectively 
co-constituted. 
Let us first isolate a sense in which this requirement–that the speaker’s 
move is complemented by the addressee’s response–is obviously 
consistent with our previous picture. In fact, we have claimed that actions 
are driven by behavioural schemata representing expected outcomes, 
together with actions and circumstances. For example, when producing a 
question a speaker is clearly aiming to obtain an answer, so that the 
answer is an expected completion of her communicative move. In this 
sense, the meaning of a communicative act depends on the expected 
response, but in a way that is consistent with our commitment to 
individual intentions. The coordination of speaker and addressee is 
obtained insofar as the two converge towards the same behavioural 
Marco Mazzone 
69 
schema: for instance, the addressee correctly grasps the speaker’s intention 
of obtaining an answer. 
Interesting cases, then, are not those we have just considered where 
there is completion without negotiation; rather, the genuine issue is 
completion-with-negotiation. This issue can be framed in terms of the 
notion of communicative strength. On the one hand, as we saw in §5, 
communicative strength may be considered an effect of the weight of 
precedents: normative value is put on communicative moves which are 
part of strongly conventionalized routines. On the other hand, however, 
the strength of communicative acts seems to depend rather on current 
interactions. In order to further analyse this issue, it is convenient to 
distinguish three different ways in which the addressee may so contribute 
to determine the speaker’s intention. 
One case is when the speaker has a previous determinate intention 
which is not dependent on the addressee. This case should not be excluded 
in principle, and in fact we will consider in a moment one instance of it. 
Incidentally, this is when the word “negotiation” has its literal meaning: 
interlocutors have their own goals, though those goals can be somehow 
modified or fine-tuned in the course of reciprocal interaction. Far from 
speaking against individual intentions, then, this case clearly presupposes 
them. 
Literal negotiation of meaning appears to occur both in cooperative 
and conflictual communication. An interesting example of conflictual 
communication, which appeared in Levinson (1992), is the following 
extract from Haldeman’s testimony before the Senate committee that 
conducted the Watergate hearing: 
 
Q: You saw all of the papers that were being reviewed, did you not? 
A: Not all the working papers of the committee. I saw the 
recommendations that went to the President. 
Q: Did you read the recommendations that went to the President? 
A: I am not sure I did or not. If I did it was not in any detail. 
 
As Levinson (1992: 77) observes, when saying that we saw some 
reading matter we generally would intend that we read it, though we can 
surely cancel this implicature by some explicit statement (“I saw it, but I 
did not read it”). Since the first answer does not contain any such 
qualification, the interpretation that Haldeman in fact read the 
recommendations that went to the President seems to be authorized. 
However, in this context 
 
“we understand the implicature to be cancelled because, given our 
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understanding of legal inquiries, we know it is often not in the interests of 
a defendant to cooperate beyond the minimum required to escape contempt 
of court. In particular, we know that he may try to avoid committing 
himself to any definite statement of fact; knowing which, the interrogator 
cannot be content with implicatures that can later be denied–hence he has 
to ask the second question, that seeks assent for the inference from saw to 
read” (ib.: 77). 
 
In other words, the interrogator tries to obtain assent to the 
interpretation according to which Haldeman read the recommendations, 
while Haldeman refuses to accept this as the correct interpretation of his 
previous answer. Alternatively, we could say that the speaker has the 
intention not to convey any precise content as to whether or not he read 
the recommendations, while the addressee wants the answer to be precise 
on this point. In fact, there is some indetermination as to what exactly has 
happened in terms of individual intentions: we will come back to this in a 
moment. But under any reconstruction, speaker and addressee appear to be 
driven by conflicting intentions, which they aim to discover and possibly 
force to their profit. As we saw above (section 2), Levinson’s suggestion is 
that both intentional action and its understanding are largely constrained 
by activity types (in this case, the type could be something like “legal 
inquiry”); however, subjects must have stored appropriate behavioural 
schemata in order for activity types to guide their behaviour and 
understanding. As far as such schemata are used in strategic control of 
action, we can say that agents have determinate intentions (we have 
proposed in fact to conceive of intentions as behavioural schemata driving 
action, rather than as private thoughts), and addressees may be willing to 
negotiate and possibly change those intentions. 
Could not it be possible, however, that there is no determinate 
intention behind an agent’s behaviour? As far as I can tell, this might 
happen in two ways. First, the agent’s behaviour might essentially be an 
automatic response, with representation of outcomes playing no 
appreciable role in behavioural control. Second, given the multiplicity of 
behavioural schemata which are presumably involved in a single action, it 
could be difficult for the agent herself to determine which outcome is 
precisely intended, that is, explicitly represented in the service of 
behavioural control. When one of these two cases occurs (or both of them 
occur together), then people could happen to discover their intention “only 
because the other perceives it and responds accordingly”–in Gallagher’s 
words. This possibility, however, should not be overestimated. On the one 
hand, given the pervasiveness of goal-directed behaviour in humans, it is 
easily imagined that mere automatic responses are not very frequent. On 
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the other hand, most of the times multiplicity of possible intentions might 
not leave much room for the addressee, since all possible interpretations 
are largely congruent with each other (as in Levinson’s example from 
Watergate hearing). Therefore, the extent to which communicative 
intentions are not determined by the speaker, and hence are open to be 
determined by the addressee, appears to be rather limited. 
There are other cases, however, where the speaker may be credited 
with a determinate intention which is nonetheless dependent on the 
addressee. In other words, in those cases what the speaker says receives its 
strength from the addressee, whose expectations the speaker has aimed to 
incorporate in her discourse. A typical case in point is political discourse. 
For instance, Capone (in press) has analysed Barak Obama’s speeches in 
this perspective: 
 
“In Obama’s speech, I analyze the case in which a politician makes use of 
the people’s voices in order to show that he correctly represents the needs 
and sentiments of his nation, thus being entitled to represent them as a 
political leader and to do what is good for them. The speech emerges not as 
something for which Obama is responsible, but as something for which the 
people (in particular those attending the electoral speech) are responsible”. 
 
Such a phenomenon is but an instance of a general aptitude of humans 
for “positioning themselves in a Bakhtinian dialogic universe of voices 
other than their own” (Lauerbach 2006: 198). In other words, we humans 
are sensitive to others’ emotions, preferences and attitudes, and inclined to 
take them into account in our own discourse, to the point that we could be 
intended at times as speaking in the name of others: “In Goffman’s (1974; 
1981) terms, a figure other than the speaker is being animated without the 
speaker being understood to be either the author of the words or to be 
responsible for them” (Lauerbach 2006: 198-9). 
However, this aptitude for incorporating the others’ voices, attitudes 
and points of view into our discourses makes appeal to a general ability to 
recognise goals and intentions involved in others’ and our own behaviours. 
As Capone observes, the relationship between the politician and the people 
whose point of view has to be represented 
 
“is not one of telepathy, but one of rationally guessing what kind of issues 
and attitudes the represented person would like to have addressed. The 
political leader has to guess what is of importance to his electorate, and his 
success is based on that of his rational guesses”. 
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In other words, just as in the above case of literal negotiation, so in this 
case it must be presupposed that there are genuine individual goals and 
points of view to be recognised in the service of a strategic interaction 
between subjects. In particular, when the speaker tries to anticipate the 
addressee’s reactions in order to incorporate them into her own discourse, 
she can do it more or less correctly with regard to the addressee’s real 
goals and preferences. Therefore, the speaker’s communicative intention is 
in a sense determined by the addressee but, once again, in a way that 
presupposes individual intentions rather than speaking against them. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
I do not presume to have considered all possible cases of negotiation 
or, for that matter, all possible aspects of normativity in discourse. Our 
discussion, however, should have made it clear that in most cases there is 
no contradiction between socio-interactive co-constitution of 
communicative intentions and the existence of individual behavioural 
schemata driving intentional action. 
In the first place, social routines may place some normative strength on 
individual moves embedded in them, and people may perform such moves 
partly as a mere consequence of the weight of precedents, without any 
explicit representation of the outcomes. In the second place, there is an 
intrinsic relationship between speaker’s and addressee’s moves, since 
communicative acts are instances of goal-directed behaviour and, 
specifically, they are oriented from the beginning towards the addressee 
responses. This may show up either simply in anticipation of the 
addressee’s move (the speaker prefigures the response), or in people trying 
to strategically incorporate the addressee’s preferences and goals in their 
speaking. The addressee may in turn try to influence speaker’s goals, more 
or less consciously attempting to change the way these goals shape current 
discourse. 
None of these facts, however, is conceivable without presupposing that 
people store behavioural schemata framing their goal-directed behaviour 
and their understanding of others. We have proposed that such schemata 
have a rational structure based on the association between action, 
outcomes and circumstances. Moreover, since the social practices of 
rational discussion in humans appear to be based on the very same 
structure, it is no surprise that reflective processes may influence human 
action. The Western model of rational action is but an explicit formulation 
of the way this influence occurs. 
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